Planned German Invasion of Poland on the 26th of August 1939

[Karl_fallout4]

This presents a challenge to the revisionist interpretation of the causes of the Second World War. The initial plan for the German campaign in Poland was to launch an invasion on the 26th of August, with the plan only being cancelled at the last minute upon the notice that Britain would declare war if Poland was invaded.
Even with this, some German troops that hadn't received the cancellation order went ahead with the invasion, leading to border violations such as the Jablunkov Pass incident.
Germany's immediate justification for the war was that uniformed Polish troops had crossed the German border. This incident appears to contradict their justification.

[TlsMS93]

There is also the issue that Ribbentrop refused to give Henderson a copy of the 16 points on the eve of the attack and they almost came to blows, with Ribbentrop laughing on the way out, painting a picture that they wanted war and not a genuine agreement.

[Hektor]

You'll have to source every single statement there.

Bear in mind that the armies were already at least partially mobilized. And there is the potential of some confusion in this.

Also in post processing various incidents can also be conflated.

There were several unresolved German-Polish issues at hand at the time. They were serious. And could have resolved without war. That's as long as both sides are willing to cooperate.

[Karl_fallout4]

You'll have to source every single statement there.

https://web.archive.org/web/20160303234 ... pisma.html

David Hoggan also mentions these events.

Hitler's Order for Operations in Poland on August 26th

Hitler believed that he had no moment to lose after this conversation. He wished to settle with the Poles while the impact of his agreement offer was still fresh, and before the British and French discovered that Italy did not intend to support him. He was convinced that his only real chance to settle the Polish dispute by isolated military action in a local war had arrived, and that hesitation at that moment would cost Germany great suffering in the time ahead. Hitler telephoned General Walther von Brauchitsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed Forces, immediately after the departure of Henderson. He ordered formal and full-scale military operations against the Poles for the following morning at dawn. General Wilhelm Keitel, the Chief-of-Staff, distributed orders by 3:05 p.m. on August 25th for the launching of "Operation White." The commands were received by the individual German Army commanders on the various sectors in the East, and by the commanders of the Siegfried Line in the West, where the relevant defensive preparations were soon underway. Polish telephone communications through Germany were interrupted by order of the German military authorities shortly before 3:00 p.m. on August 25th. Polish Foreign Minister Beck was worried by this development, but he concluded that it might be part of the war-of-nerves rather than an indication of a coming attack. The Poles did not order the mobilization of their last reserve units. An attack on August 26th would have found the Poles much less prepared than was the case when the German-Polish war actually broke out nearly a week later.

Polish Ambassador Lipski called at the German Foreign Office twice on the afternoon of August 25th to present complaints about recent German border violations. He announced that the Polish border guard, Edmund Piatkowski, had been shot and killed from ambush at the Donnersmarck Park along the Upper Silesian frontier. He also announced that a German Corporal named Kapenhagen was shot and killed inside the Polish frontier in the Bialystok district. Lipski complained that Kapenhagen had penetrated Polish territory with a patrol of ten German soldiers. The Germans complained about two Polish air attacks over Danzig Bay against a German pontoon airplane from Pillau, East Prussia. They also objected to Polish violations of the German frontier. These incidents were a commonplace indication of the chaotic conditions resulting from the German-Polish crisis.
~The Forced War, pg. 352-353, David L. Hoggan

[Hektor]

OK, that's some commentary on the late August events.

It's pretty clear that stuff went more chaotic in August 1939. The problem is that there isn't full archive disclosure, that there is an anti-German bias in historiography and that some information probably was lost including people that took their memories with them into the grave. Always recall the elderly that said stuff that deviated from the common narrative and nobody wanted to believe them. Although I think some did notice something there.

[Karl_fallout4]

This is Hoggan we're talking about though, he's not writing with an anti-German bias. He wrote "The Forced War" to show that that Germany was forced into the war. I'm sure that there's more information about the event to be uncovered.

[Wheels]

This presents a challenge to the revisionist interpretation of the causes of the Second World War.

He wrote "The Forced War" to show that that Germany was forced into the war.

Hoggan's book would be more representative of a "revisionist interpretation of the causes of the Second World War" than whatever you're proposing to challenge here.

It's still often claimed that there was a German master plan for war years in the making and, for example, Poland had been on the menu for years. The revisionist account is that Hitler dynamically responded to world events. In particular, downsides were engineered by his opponents for either the choice of going to war or not going to war. A gamble had to be made either way.

The initial plan for the German campaign in Poland was to launch an invasion on the 26th of August, with the plan only being cancelled at the last minute upon the notice that Britain would declare war if Poland was invaded.

Also upon Italy notifying Germany that it is not ready to support Germany in an eventual conflict, also upon needing to better assess and coordinate the Pact with the Soviets, also upon receiving additional false news from Poland's enablers of Poland getting ready to talk, only to find out games were being played again. There were multiple things on the plate to mull over... Isn't this all in The Forced War anyway?

Germany's immediate justification for the war was that uniformed Polish troops had crossed the German border. This incident appears to contradict their justification.

Germany's immediate justification with respect to the border, which is a tiny part of the very public justification for the war issued by the country's leader, is as follows:

Similar events repeated themselves in the course of last night. And this after the recent perpetration of twenty-one border transgressions in the span of one single night. Yesterday fourteen additional violations of the border were recorded, among them three of a most serious nature. I have therefore resolved to speak to Poland in the same language that Poland has employed towards us in the months past.
[...]
I will cleanse Germany’s borders of this element of insecurity, this civilwar-like circumstance. I will take care that our border in the East enjoys the same peace as along any other of our borders.

https://der-fuehrer.org/reden/english/39-09-01.htm

It appears to address border incidents starting months ago. Of course, you should look at the rest of the text as well.

[fireofice]

There is also the issue that Ribbentrop refused to give Henderson a copy of the 16 points on the eve of the attack and they almost came to blows, with Ribbentrop laughing on the way out, painting a picture that they wanted war and not a genuine agreement.

Another thing from Wikipedia:

During the crisis, Ribbentrop refused to allow any talks with the Poles as it was always Ribbentrop's great fear that the Poles might actually agree to the Free City returning to Germany, thereby depriving the Reich of its pretext for attacking Poland.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Danzig_crisis

I would like to know what the primary source is for both of these claims.

[TlsMS93]

There is also the issue that Ribbentrop refused to give Henderson a copy of the 16 points on the eve of the attack and they almost came to blows, with Ribbentrop laughing on the way out, painting a picture that they wanted war and not a genuine agreement.

Another thing from Wikipedia:

During the crisis, Ribbentrop refused to allow any talks with the Poles as it was always Ribbentrop's great fear that the Poles might actually agree to the Free City returning to Germany, thereby depriving the Reich of its pretext for attacking Poland.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Danzig_crisis

I would like to know what the primary source is for both of these claims.

You have to access the footnotes of the book she mentions

The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany: Starting World War II, 1937-1939 p. 560-562 & 583-584. - Gerhard L. Weinberg