Hitler: "Danzig is not the objective" -- Is this quote authentic?
Posted: Thu Aug 27, 2026 7:22 pm
This supposed Hitler quote is used to undermine one of Germany's justifications for attacking Poland. It is used on Wikipedia, across the internet, and in many books. It most often appears in a highly abbreviated form, with considerable context cut out and replaced with ellipses.
I have no special training in authenticating documents, but it occurs to me right away that this quote is overly convenient for those who want to portray Germany as negatively as possible. Hence why it is used so frequently.
What of its authenticity? One thing that jumps out is that, if Hitler said these words, then he referred to himself in the third person: "The Fuhrer gave... The Fuhrer must..." These are not Hitler's own words but then-Lt. Col. Rudolf Schmundt's notes.
I found a British translation of these notes in Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, accessible on the Internet Archive. The text as given:
I've cut it halfway. These notes continue on similar themes for several more pages.
The person who prepared this document collection adds that this document was used at Nuremberg and also that it includes handwritten corrections by Schmundt and by another hand. Schmundt himself was killed in 1944. I don't yet know if these facts bear on the document's authenticity. For now I assume they do not.
A German version of these notes is hosted here. I assume it is the most original version.
Now let's compare the three versions of this quote.
Wikipedia version: "Danzig is not the objective."
British translation: "It is not Danzig that is at stake."
Original German: "Danzig ist nicht das Objekt, um das es geht."
Literal translation: "Danzig is not the object this is about."
To translate "Objekt" (object) as "objective" (objektiv) is really not correct. It conveys a meaning that was not present in the original.
Even to translate this as "Danzig is not at stake" is misleading if taken maliciously out of context. Hitler (assuming his authorship) obviously did not mean to imply that Danzig was not important, that he didn't care about it, that Danzigers were expendable, or that he didn't seek reunification. If we know anything about Hitler we know that he was passionately nationalistic, so he must have wanted Danzig for its own sake. It would be a misread of his character to say anything else. However, Danzig was a small city under duress. Compared to the problem of feeding 80 million, the latter was clearly a more pressing issue for the head of state. Thus, it would be perfectly in character for Hitler to say rhetorically that Danzig is at issue but not the issue he was preoccupied with.
It is fair to interpret some cynicism from Hitler (again assuming his authorship and the correctness of these notes). He anticipated war would be forced upon him sooner or later, and he saw that as his opportunity to control lands he deemed vital to Germany's survival. Rescuing Danzig was a compelling interest, perhaps even a foregone conclusion, but not the most compelling interest.
More to the point, this misquote is being used to try to delegitimize what is a self-evidently legitimate invasion. Let's try a metaphor. If Mexico was occupying Texas, would the U.S. be justified in invading Mexico? Yes. Would the U.S. lose that justification if the POTUS claimed there were alternative interests for invasion? Of course not. Americans would especially support aggressive measures if, simultaneous to this, Guatemala or other Central American states were flipping Communist and building up a military presence.
In summary: It is both a misquote and mistranslation. But I am open to other interpretations.
Some unrelated thoughts I had.
On invasion, the word "incursion" or "breaking in" is put in quotation marks. Evidently this is the author complaining that "all claims" of the territorial sort are propagandized by Germany's enemies as being like military invasions, probably referring to Austria and Sudetenland.
On Lebensraum, the author says that it is a "solution to the food problem". Lebensraum comes "only" from farming "thinly populated areas". I don't see where it talks about or even hints at expulsion or extermination of local populations. To the contrary, it goes on to say that "The populations of non-German territories... are available for labour service." This is still in the context of farming. So non-Germans would contribute to German Lebensraum by farming?
I have no special training in authenticating documents, but it occurs to me right away that this quote is overly convenient for those who want to portray Germany as negatively as possible. Hence why it is used so frequently.
What of its authenticity? One thing that jumps out is that, if Hitler said these words, then he referred to himself in the third person: "The Fuhrer gave... The Fuhrer must..." These are not Hitler's own words but then-Lt. Col. Rudolf Schmundt's notes.
I found a British translation of these notes in Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, accessible on the Internet Archive. The text as given:
Spoiler
No. 433
Nuremberg document 79-L
Exhibit USA-27
Minutes of a Conference on May 23, 1939
TOP SECRET
To be handled by officer only.
Place: The Fuhrer's study, New Reich Chancellery.
Adjutant on Duty: Lt. Col. (General Staff) Schmundt.
Present: The Fuhrer, Field Marshal Goring, Grand Admiral Raeder, Colonel General von Brauchitsch, Colonel General Keitel, Colonel General Milch, General (of Artillery) Haider, General Bodenschatz, Rear-Admiral Schniewind, Colonel (attached to the General Staff) Jeschonnek, Colonel (General Staff) Warlimont, Lieutenant Colonel (General Staff) Schmundt, Captain Engel (Army), Lieutenant Commander Albrecht, Captain von Below (Army).
Subject: Briefing on the Situation and Political Objectives
The Fuhrer gave as the purpose of the conference:
(1) Review of the situation.
(2) To set the Armed Forces the tasks arising from the situation.
(3) Definition of the conclusions to be drawn from these tasks.
(4) Ensuring that secrecy is maintained on all decisions and measures resulting from these conclusions. Secrecy is the prerequisite for success.
The gist of the Fuhrer's statements is as follows.
Our present position must be viewed under two aspects.
(a) Actual development from 1933-1939.
(b) Germany's never-changing situation.
From 1933-1939 progress in all spheres. Our military situation improved enormously.
Our situation vis-a-vis the surrounding world has remained the same.
Germany was outside the circle of the Great Powers. A balance of power had been established without Germany's participation.
This balance is being disturbed by Germany claiming her vital rights and her reappearance in the circle of the Great Powers. All claims are regarded as "breaking in".
The English are more afraid of economic dangers than of ordinary threats of force.
The ideological problems have been solved by the mass of 80,000,000 people. The economic problems must also be solved. To create the economic conditions necessary for this is a task no German can disregard. The solution of the problems demands courage. The principle must not prevail that one can accommodate oneself to the circumstances and thus shirk the solution of the problems. The circumstances must rather be adapted to suit the demands. This is not possible without "breaking in" to other countries or attacking other people's possessions.
Living space proportionate to the greatness of the State is fundamental to every Power. One can do without it for a time but sooner or later the problems will have to be solved by hook or by crook. The alternatives are rise or decline. In fifteen or twenty years' time the solution will be forced upon us. No German statesman can shirk the problem for longer.
At present we are in a state of national ebullience as are two other states: Italy and Japan.
The years behind us have been put to good use. All measures were consistently directed towards the goal.
After six years the present position is as follows:
The national political unification of the Germans has been achieved bar minor exceptions. Further successes can no longer be won without bloodshed.
The delineation of frontiers is of military importance.
The Pole is not a fresh enemy. Poland will always be on the side of our adversaries. In spite of treaties of friendship Poland has always been bent on exploiting every opportunity against us.
It is not Danzig that is at stake. For us it is a matter of expanding our living space in the East and making food supplies secure and also solving the problem of the Baltic States. Food supplies can only be obtained from thinly populated areas. Over and above fertility, the thorough German cultivation will tremendously increase the produce.
No other openings can be seen in Europe.
Colonies: A warning against gifts of colonial possessions. This is no solution of the food problem. Blockade!
If fate forces us into a showdown with the West it is good to possess a largish area in the East. In war time we shall be even less able to rely on record harvests than in peace time.
The populations of non-German territories do not render military service and are available for labour service.
The problem "Poland" cannot be dissociated from the showdown with the West. Poland's internal solidarity against Bolshevism is doubtful. Therefore Poland is also a doubtful barrier against Russia.
Success in war in the West with a rapid decision is questionable and so is Poland's attitude.
The Polish regime will not stand up to Russian pressure. Poland sees danger in a German victory over the West and will try to deprive us of victory.
There is therefore no question of sparing Poland and we are left with the decision:
To attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity.
We cannot expect a repetition of Czechia. There will be war. Our task is to isolate Poland. Success in isolating her will be decisive.
Therefore the Fuhrer must reserve to himself the final order to strike. It must not come to a simultaneous showdown with the West (France and England).
If it is not definitely certain that a German-Polish conflict will not lead to war with the West then the fight must be primarily against England and France.
Nuremberg document 79-L
Exhibit USA-27
Minutes of a Conference on May 23, 1939
TOP SECRET
To be handled by officer only.
Place: The Fuhrer's study, New Reich Chancellery.
Adjutant on Duty: Lt. Col. (General Staff) Schmundt.
Present: The Fuhrer, Field Marshal Goring, Grand Admiral Raeder, Colonel General von Brauchitsch, Colonel General Keitel, Colonel General Milch, General (of Artillery) Haider, General Bodenschatz, Rear-Admiral Schniewind, Colonel (attached to the General Staff) Jeschonnek, Colonel (General Staff) Warlimont, Lieutenant Colonel (General Staff) Schmundt, Captain Engel (Army), Lieutenant Commander Albrecht, Captain von Below (Army).
Subject: Briefing on the Situation and Political Objectives
The Fuhrer gave as the purpose of the conference:
(1) Review of the situation.
(2) To set the Armed Forces the tasks arising from the situation.
(3) Definition of the conclusions to be drawn from these tasks.
(4) Ensuring that secrecy is maintained on all decisions and measures resulting from these conclusions. Secrecy is the prerequisite for success.
The gist of the Fuhrer's statements is as follows.
Our present position must be viewed under two aspects.
(a) Actual development from 1933-1939.
(b) Germany's never-changing situation.
From 1933-1939 progress in all spheres. Our military situation improved enormously.
Our situation vis-a-vis the surrounding world has remained the same.
Germany was outside the circle of the Great Powers. A balance of power had been established without Germany's participation.
This balance is being disturbed by Germany claiming her vital rights and her reappearance in the circle of the Great Powers. All claims are regarded as "breaking in".
The English are more afraid of economic dangers than of ordinary threats of force.
The ideological problems have been solved by the mass of 80,000,000 people. The economic problems must also be solved. To create the economic conditions necessary for this is a task no German can disregard. The solution of the problems demands courage. The principle must not prevail that one can accommodate oneself to the circumstances and thus shirk the solution of the problems. The circumstances must rather be adapted to suit the demands. This is not possible without "breaking in" to other countries or attacking other people's possessions.
Living space proportionate to the greatness of the State is fundamental to every Power. One can do without it for a time but sooner or later the problems will have to be solved by hook or by crook. The alternatives are rise or decline. In fifteen or twenty years' time the solution will be forced upon us. No German statesman can shirk the problem for longer.
At present we are in a state of national ebullience as are two other states: Italy and Japan.
The years behind us have been put to good use. All measures were consistently directed towards the goal.
After six years the present position is as follows:
The national political unification of the Germans has been achieved bar minor exceptions. Further successes can no longer be won without bloodshed.
The delineation of frontiers is of military importance.
The Pole is not a fresh enemy. Poland will always be on the side of our adversaries. In spite of treaties of friendship Poland has always been bent on exploiting every opportunity against us.
It is not Danzig that is at stake. For us it is a matter of expanding our living space in the East and making food supplies secure and also solving the problem of the Baltic States. Food supplies can only be obtained from thinly populated areas. Over and above fertility, the thorough German cultivation will tremendously increase the produce.
No other openings can be seen in Europe.
Colonies: A warning against gifts of colonial possessions. This is no solution of the food problem. Blockade!
If fate forces us into a showdown with the West it is good to possess a largish area in the East. In war time we shall be even less able to rely on record harvests than in peace time.
The populations of non-German territories do not render military service and are available for labour service.
The problem "Poland" cannot be dissociated from the showdown with the West. Poland's internal solidarity against Bolshevism is doubtful. Therefore Poland is also a doubtful barrier against Russia.
Success in war in the West with a rapid decision is questionable and so is Poland's attitude.
The Polish regime will not stand up to Russian pressure. Poland sees danger in a German victory over the West and will try to deprive us of victory.
There is therefore no question of sparing Poland and we are left with the decision:
To attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity.
We cannot expect a repetition of Czechia. There will be war. Our task is to isolate Poland. Success in isolating her will be decisive.
Therefore the Fuhrer must reserve to himself the final order to strike. It must not come to a simultaneous showdown with the West (France and England).
If it is not definitely certain that a German-Polish conflict will not lead to war with the West then the fight must be primarily against England and France.
The person who prepared this document collection adds that this document was used at Nuremberg and also that it includes handwritten corrections by Schmundt and by another hand. Schmundt himself was killed in 1944. I don't yet know if these facts bear on the document's authenticity. For now I assume they do not.
A German version of these notes is hosted here. I assume it is the most original version.
Now let's compare the three versions of this quote.
Wikipedia version: "Danzig is not the objective."
British translation: "It is not Danzig that is at stake."
Original German: "Danzig ist nicht das Objekt, um das es geht."
Literal translation: "Danzig is not the object this is about."
To translate "Objekt" (object) as "objective" (objektiv) is really not correct. It conveys a meaning that was not present in the original.
Even to translate this as "Danzig is not at stake" is misleading if taken maliciously out of context. Hitler (assuming his authorship) obviously did not mean to imply that Danzig was not important, that he didn't care about it, that Danzigers were expendable, or that he didn't seek reunification. If we know anything about Hitler we know that he was passionately nationalistic, so he must have wanted Danzig for its own sake. It would be a misread of his character to say anything else. However, Danzig was a small city under duress. Compared to the problem of feeding 80 million, the latter was clearly a more pressing issue for the head of state. Thus, it would be perfectly in character for Hitler to say rhetorically that Danzig is at issue but not the issue he was preoccupied with.
It is fair to interpret some cynicism from Hitler (again assuming his authorship and the correctness of these notes). He anticipated war would be forced upon him sooner or later, and he saw that as his opportunity to control lands he deemed vital to Germany's survival. Rescuing Danzig was a compelling interest, perhaps even a foregone conclusion, but not the most compelling interest.
More to the point, this misquote is being used to try to delegitimize what is a self-evidently legitimate invasion. Let's try a metaphor. If Mexico was occupying Texas, would the U.S. be justified in invading Mexico? Yes. Would the U.S. lose that justification if the POTUS claimed there were alternative interests for invasion? Of course not. Americans would especially support aggressive measures if, simultaneous to this, Guatemala or other Central American states were flipping Communist and building up a military presence.
In summary: It is both a misquote and mistranslation. But I am open to other interpretations.
Some unrelated thoughts I had.
On invasion, the word "incursion" or "breaking in" is put in quotation marks. Evidently this is the author complaining that "all claims" of the territorial sort are propagandized by Germany's enemies as being like military invasions, probably referring to Austria and Sudetenland.
On Lebensraum, the author says that it is a "solution to the food problem". Lebensraum comes "only" from farming "thinly populated areas". I don't see where it talks about or even hints at expulsion or extermination of local populations. To the contrary, it goes on to say that "The populations of non-German territories... are available for labour service." This is still in the context of farming. So non-Germans would contribute to German Lebensraum by farming?