The CODOH Revisionist Forum

inductive reasoning about the causes of World War II

Induction is a reasoning when a general conclusion is gradually built on the basis of individual cases. This is the method used by Sherlock Holmes in Conan Doyle's detective stories, and not deduction, which is the exact opposite - when an explanation is brought from a general theory to individual facts. So, let's try to imagine that we know nothing about WWII, and only look at the facts separately...

There is Germany - once a great power that lost the war, which was significantly humiliated by the Versailles Agreements and disarmed, colonies were taken away, partially occupied (Ruhr, Saar).

There are allies - they defeated the Germans, have powerful armed forces, colonial possessions all over the planet. They overcome the crisis at the expense of reparations collected from Germany.

There is Poland - a new (or rather "new-old") country on the map of Europe, which in addition to purely Polish territories grabbed parts of German land in 1919-20 where Germans lived. Although Poland did not exist during WWI, it was allowed (with the permission of the Allies) to appropriate these territories. It is also - compared to Germany before 1933 - quite militarized.

At some point in Germany, the National Socialists come to power in elections. They rose on a wave of general German discontent with this situation. In 1934, the Germans concluded an agreement with Poland to secure their borders. Then there was quite successful cooperation, which reached its peak in the fall of 1938 during the Sudeten crisis.

And now, having restored almost all German territories, the National Socialists turn to the Poles. Although the situation was much worse for Germany than with the Sudetenland (Czechoslovakia in 1919, at least, did not seize territory from the bleeding country), Hitler tried to convey his position carefully, but was met with a decisive refusal from the Poles.

An attempt to soften the position by demanding the return of the corridor for the construction of an extraterritorial railway might have been successful, but in March 1939 Poland received guarantees from Great Britain. This gave the Poles a (false) sense of security, and discouraged any compromises with the Germans.

Then there was the tense summer of 1939, new attempts to reach an agreement, a customs war in Danzig, shootouts on the borders, the Gleiwitz incident and, finally, a full-scale invasion.

On the eve of the invasion, a non-aggression pact was also signed with Soviet Russia, since it became obvious that as a result of the war, Germany and its zone of interest would most likely border directly on the Soviet one.

On September 1, '39, there was no Second World War. It was only a German-Polish war over the Danzig Corridor. It did not start on the 2nd either. Only on September 3, when France and Great Britain declared war on Germany, did WWII become a legal fact.

So, from the particular facts presented above, let's move on to the general conclusion. After World War I, the Germans felt vulnerable compared to their neighboring powers. Germany was not solely to blame for WWI, which even official historians now admit, and yet it was cruelly punished. Discontent gave rise to opposition, and since 1933 the new authorities have sought to restore all the territories they had previously owned. By 1939, the process had actually come to an end, but the intransigence of the Polish government, together with the intransigence of the allies, ruled out a peaceful solution to the last territorial crisis.

In other words, Germany, although it bears the blame for starting the war against Poland (the German-Polish conflict over Danzig), is not the only one to blame for the outbreak of WWII. The latter became possible only as a result of the declaration of war on the Germans by the British and French.

This is the conclusion of inductive reasoning regarding the causes of the outbreak of World War II.

Good thread - some observations:

While there is nothing glaringly inaccurate in anything you wrote above, this would be considered WWII Revisionism, which in and of itself is remarkable, and would be baffling to hear for someone trying to apply inductive reasoning as in your example. As early as 1926, credible academics like Sidney Bradshaw Fay were writing persuasive arguments for the "Germany As Fall Guy" thesis, as it applied to WWI. I haven't read it yet, but Christopher Clarke's book is resting on my bookshelf beside me and he seemingly makes a similar case. WWI Revisionism isn't met with the rabid hostility and lawfare that WWII Revisionism is, except ironically to the extent that that WWI Revisionism can be applied to Hitler apologetics! The reason why WWI Revisionism is relevant here, is that while Germany were blamed for both, just under the surface this blame is extremely shallow and flakes away under any interrogation.

Regarding Poland, I understand you are summarising a complex history, however it's too oversimplistic to say "there was quite successful cooperation" between Germany and Poland until the Danzig crisis. After Pilsudski’s death in May 1935, two Polish expansionists took control of Poland’s Foreign Policy, who's constant agitating severely impacted German-Polish relations - these were Foreign Minister Beck and Commander-in-Chief Rydz-Smigly.

This summary also ignores the entirety of the Western Front and rising tensions, for example the Locarno crises, which soured German relations with France & Britain. On the Locarno Crises and its failed negotiations, we have this prophetic quote:

“The German Government, and the whole German Nation are convinced that the resolution which the Council has adopted will not be ratified by history” - Joachim von Ribbentrop, 19 March 1936

Although this may seem like an oversimplification, I have approached it from the perspective of an observer who knows nothing about WWII. Not from a revisionist position.

Official historians state in advance what is far from clear: that Germany (and also Japan) were eager to start a war.

The fact is that if this were true, Hitler would not have tried time and again to settle the conflict with Poland. The last such attempt was on August 30, 1939, when the Germans made a 16-point proposal, distinguished by its softness and moderate demands. In contrast, Poland had already declared a general mobilization on that day.

There was, of course, no full-fledged political alliance between Poland and Germany, but between 1934 and 1938 relations were quite good, especially in comparison with what happened before and after. The statements of J. Karsho-Sedlevsky, a former adviser to the Polish embassy in Moscow, who was appointed envoy of Poland to Iran in December 1938, are also characteristic. On December 28, on the eve of his departure for Tehran, Karsho-Sedlevsky had a conversation with adviser von Schelia, to whom he stated that “the difficulties that currently exist in relations between Germany and Poland should not be considered particularly serious.” He said that there had been difficult moments in the past, but Germany and Poland had successfully overcome their differences. Karsho-Sedlevsky had no doubt that the differences that arose at that time would also be overcome – on an anti-Soviet basis (Sergei Lozunko, "The Ugly Child of Versailles" That Caused World War II https://history.wikireading.ru/193292).

The crisis on the Western borders of the Reich did not lead to war, unlike the Danzig crisis, and this is why it was not mentioned. The remilitarization of the Rhineland was a clear violation of the Versailles Treaty, but the Allies did not respond properly - mainly because they were not prepared for another war.

However, the crisis had both political and military consequences: the Germans began to build fortifications on the border with France, called the Siegfried Line.

All this creates the impression that the Allies were buying time to prepare for war. Although this is also a deductive conclusion, similar to that of official historians, so one must be careful in applying it.

The events of 1939 showed that Germany was seeking a peaceful settlement. Even after the Wehrmacht had entered Poland, a full occupation of the Polish state was not considered for about a week. However, the speed with which the Poles lost and their state collapsed forced the AH to decide to create a General Government, instead of the intended forcible return of only the German-populated territories in the first week of September, while preserving an independent Poland in the remaining areas.

The peace proposal of October 6, 1939 and the subsequent one of July 19, 1940 also indirectly indicate that Germany was not a unilateral "warmonger", but was instead reacting to the political events of its time.

Unfortunately, this kind of inductive thinking can be perceived as revisionism. I have encountered this before when I spoke about starting a war in the Pacific. Japan did not want to start this conflict, as their desperate negotiations with the US indicate. Anti-Japanese sanctions threatened to collapse the Japanese economy, and contributed to December 7, 1941.

Roosevelt and his administration needed an argument against the isolationism that was popular at the time. PH became such an argument. When I pointed this out, I was quickly criticized as a "revisionist".

I agree with your points above except one, the same point again about German-Polish relations. I don't want to derail this thread however I'll just say that German-Polish relations were increasingly toxic since the death of Pidsulski up until the outbreak of war, perhaps we can start a new thread on this topic.

One other point of observation: i understand that the disintegrating Western relations didn't lead directly to WWII the way the Danzig crisis did. However in your good-faith attempt at inductive reasoning, you must investigate these distintegrating relations as factors. Britain and France were both key players, and were the ones who ultimately declared war, and so accounting for these relations is key - you have already done so for Germany / Poland / SU and so I'm merely extending the scope to include Br & Fr. Those relations are every bit as important to the outbreak of war as Ger / Pol / SU

HansHill wrote: ↑Sun Apr 06, 2025 3:16 pm I agree with your points above except one, the same point again about German-Polish relations. I don't want to derail this thread however I'll just say that German-Polish relations were increasingly toxic since the death of Pidsulski up until the outbreak of war, perhaps we can start a new thread on this topic.

One other point of observation: i understand that the disintegrating Western relations didn't lead directly to WWII the way the Danzig crisis did. However in your good-faith attempt at inductive reasoning, you must investigate these distintegrating relations as factors. Britain and France were both key players, and were the ones who ultimately declared war, and so accounting for these relations is key - you have already done so for Germany / Poland / SU and so I'm merely extending the scope to include Br & Fr. Those relations are every bit as important to the outbreak of war as Ger / Pol / SU

At least, from German side there was attempts to normalize relations with Poland, which failed because of policy of Western allies and anti-german chauvinism inside Poland itself. But not all elements in Polish government were anti-german before the beginning of 1939.

Throughout the post-war period (i.e. after WWI), the relations between the Allies and Germany were rather dismal, despite periods of apparent improvement in the late 1920s ("spirit of Locarno") and again in the mid-1930s ("appeasement").

For the first six months after the end of WWI and the capitulation of Germany, the blockade continued, leading to the death of thousands of German citizens by starvation.

When Germany refused to pay reparations, France simply moved in and occupied part of its territory in 1923, which was a great humiliation for the dignity of the German people.

This was also the first year that the AH became politically famous (Beer Hall Putsch).

In 1925, the Locarno Treaty was imposed on the Germans, which was a de facto unilateral demand for security of the borders of France - without similar security for the borders of the then disarmed Germany.

To the credit of Great Britain, its former Foreign Minister behaved with dignity and resolutely rejected war propaganda (the murder of Belgian children by German soldiers, for example) as a myth and falsification and apologized for it.

In contrast, after WWII, the Nuremberg (kangaroo) trial was organized, which did not meet the requirements of a normal legal process. And after some calm and a relatively adequate perception of history in the 1950s, starting in the mid-1960s, real hysteria began on the topic of the Shoah (Auschwitz trials, the Eichmann case).

The period 1926-1932 can be characterized as relatively tolerant, in terms of relations between the UK and Germany. The Allies even allowed the future Olympics to be held in Berlin without objecting.

The National Socialist Revolution of 1933 temporarily worsened these relations, which was reflected in the refusal of the Allies and the League of Nations to discuss the AH plans for comprehensive disarmament in the world. The result was Germany's withdrawal from the LoN.

The next waves of the crisis were the Saar referendum of 1935, during which the population of the occupied territory (formally governed by the League of Nations, the prototype of the UN) predictably voted to return to the Reich. The same thing happened after WWII in 1957.

Rhineland crisis that you previously mentioned, worsened relations with France to a greater extent than with England, which is quite expected, given the events of WWI, the fierce battles on French territory and the historical tensions dating back at least to 1871, if not to the 18th century.

Thus among the Allies in the period 1919-39: France is radically anti-German, England is rather pragmatic and with the main goal of "containing" the Germans, and the USA is indifferent and isolationist.

We see, by induction, that the last three years of this period were devoted to so-called "pacification", but also to active rearmament not only of Germany but also of the Allies. All this was a prelude to a major war.

Austria and Czechoslovakia were surrendered so that France and Great Britain could buy time. This move worked. In the case of Poland, obviously, they could not afford such a move. They most likely considered themselves sufficiently prepared for the conflict by the beginning of 1939, which allowed them to give the Poles false guarantees on March 31.

From continued inductive reasoning, we can conclude that the war, although not inevitable (nothing is inevitable until it happens), became probable as a result of the ignorance and chauvinism of one side, the grievances and thirst for revenge of other side, and the predatory political interests of another countries (like USSR and US).

My hypothesis is that if the German-Polish conflict had been resolved peacefully in one way or another, it would have dealt a crushing blow to the British continental strategy of "divide et empera".

While it is difficult to say how this would have happened, Pilsudski's survival after 1935 might have reconciled the AH with him, mainly on an anti-communist basis. Concessions in Danzig would have led to a solution of the territorial problem.

A peaceful Europe would have stagnated in the 1940s, although I do not see a unified union such as the European one in OTL. However, Europe would have remained a politically independent conglomerate of powers and small blocs with their own interests, instead of the two giant blocs of the second half of the 20th century as we knew it.

The US and USSR would never have become superpowers, and Britain could have existed, perhaps until the 80s or even 90s, as a full-fledged giant empire.

However, this is already an area of ​​alternative history, which goes beyond the scope of my analysis.