H. W. Koch, "Hitler's 'Programme' and the Genesis of Operation 'Barbarossa,'" Historical Journal, 1983; collected in Aspects of the Third Reich (edited by Koch).
Goodreads bio on Koch:
https://www.goodreads.com/author/show/4 ... fgang_KochBorn in Munich, Germany, November 23, 1933
Hanns Joachim Wolfgang Koch is a historian. He was a news editor for Radio Free Europe from 1952 until 1956 News editor at Radio Free Europe. 1961-1965. He earned his doctorate at Keele University in 1965. Since 1970 he has taught at the University of York.
From what I have read from Koch, it seems he was moderately revisionist yet still within the academic mainstream.
Many historians have traditionally cited Mein Kampf (and the "second" book) as a blueprint for Hitler's later actions, with great emphasis placed on the "master race" and Lebensraum and so forth. Koch cites Andreas Hillgruber as an exemplar of this (which he challenges in the article). Koch argues that Hitler's actions are better understood as reactions to specific diplomatic and military circumstances rather than being grand schemes plotted decades in advance.
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact: Koch's view is that Hitler did not want to risk remaining passive as Russia could have formed a coalition with Britain and France. Hitler's primary immediate goal with the pact was to exert "pressure" on Poland. Ribbentrop desired a continental bloc against Britain.
Britain: Koch argues that in mid-1940 Hitler's attention was dominated by Britain and he intensely desired a peace deal. He had no intention of attacking Russia at that time.
Koch notes that in June 1940, the Germans even had plans to reduce the army. This conflicts sharply with the typical "world domination" narrative.
Franz Halder (Tagebücher, 15 Jun 1940): "A precondition for this directive is the assumption that with the immediate final collapse of the enemy the task of the army has been fulfilled and that we can carry out in peace this reconstruction in enemy country, as the basis for future peace time organization."
Hitler, 25 June 1940 (Koch cites a German secondary source; I'd like to track down the primary source for this): "The war in the west has ended. France has been conquered, and I shall come, in the shortest possible time, to an understanding with England. There still remains the conflict with the east. That, however, is a task which throws up world-wide problems, like the relationship with Japan and the distribution of power in the Pacific, one might perhaps tackle it in ten years' time, perhaps I shall have to leave it to my successor. Now we have our hand full for years to come to digest and consolidate what we have obtained in Europe."
Things would soon change however as it became clear Britain would never make peace. Simultaneous with the British rejection of a peace deal, there were also emerging territorial disputes with Russia (in the Baltic countries and in Bessarabia). Halder (26 Jun 1940) recorded that "the opinion predominates that the Bessarabia question can be solved without war," however, by 30 June, Halder had begun examining the possibility of a campaign against Russia. By 21 July, Hitler became personally involved in planning such a campaign. (It is worth noting that war plans are not necessarily proof of aggression. War plans are routine in military affairs. Anglo-American historians are sometimes inconsistent on this, arguing that their "plans" are always defensive/precautionary/theoretical while citing "plans" by enemies as proof of intent.)
Around this time, Koch says Hitler gave up the idea idea of restoring the General government into satellite state of Germany. The order for Aufbau Ost was given on 7 Aug 1940. This is frequently cited as a preparatory measure for Barbarossa, but Koch says this interpretation has been "strongly contradicted by Keitel, Raeder, von Brauchitsch, Jodl and Halder." In many books, Stalin is portrayed as being amazingly blind to the German build-up, but according to Koch the German troop movements were open and not at all secret, i.e., the Germans wanted the Russians to take notice.
Führer Directive 18 (12 Nov 1940): Koch notes that it is important not to take point 5 out of context.
5) Russia.
Political discussions for the purpose of clarifying Russia's attitude in the immediate future have already begun. Regardless of the outcome of these conversations, all preparations for the East for which verbal orders have already been given will be continued.
Further directives will follow on this subject as soon as the basic operational plan of the Army has been submitted to me and approved.
https://ww2db.com/doc.php?q=3176) Landing in England.
Since changes in the general situation may make it possible, or necessary, to revert to 'Operation Sea-Lion' in the spring of 1941, the three branches of the Armed Forces will make every effort to improve in every way the conditions for such an operation.
What this actually indicates is that even at this late a date, both contingencies (against Russia and Britain) were being entertained. And these were mutually exclusive options (practically speaking).
Nov 25, 1940 - I won't go into all the details of this part, but Koch regards this as a "key date." Molotov made a list of demands that Hitler regarded as unreasonable. Koch: "Hitler read the note, put it on his desk and did not bother to reply. The die had been cast." This, he says, was the moment when war was decided upon. The directive to prepare for Barbarossa was issued on December 5. The invasion was originally planned for May 15 but was postponed till June because of the events in Yugoslavia.
Concluding Remarks: The Hillgruber position seems dead in the water (much like intentionalist views on the Holocaust). It places way too much weight on general statements made years earlier and ignores the large amount of more particular evidence contradicting the position.
I would like to extend this and compare Koch's views to those of other authors. I am aware of the "Icebreaker" hypothesis of Viktor Suvorov secondhand, but I have not reviewed the case in detail (I'm personally skeptical of it based on what I've heard about it, but I know it's fairly popular online). I'd like to review Irving, McMeekin, and others, plus some of the more recent majority/mainstream scholarship.
Hitler's Dec 11, 1941 declaration of war against the United States is a worthwhile primary source that speaks about some of these themes more broadly.
