Then you shouldn't use 'coordinated'.
Katyn shenanigans are in any case irrelevant to the
origins of reports of mass gassings in the euthanasia centres (which 'broke' in 1940-41) and the camps in Poland (which 'broke' in 1942), since the Germans didn't reveal the Katyn mass graves until April 1943.
British concerns to calm their Soviet ally arguably resulted in a
decrease in follow-on reporting of the camps in 1943, as Michael Fleming argues in Auschwitz, the allies and censorship of the Holocaust (2014). The Polish government-in-exile received many more reports about Auschwitz and the ongoing exterminations elsewhere in Poland, and passed these on to the British, but there were few big stories in the press.
The Soviet rupture of diplomatic relations with the Polish government-in-exile meant that the British were often irritated by the PGE and especially did not like the new accusation that the Germans had moved on to begin the extermination of the Polish nation with the Zamosc action, which had involved deporting some of the resettled Poles to Majdanek and Auschwitz. The PGE was pressuring for an Allied declaration along the lines of the UN declaration on the extermination of the Jews on 17 December, 1942, and the British did not want to make another big announcement.
It was in this context that Foreign Office senior official Victor Cavendish-Bentick made a note for the files which contains some problematic stings in the tail *for revisionists*, even if other parts seem at first glance to support them.
In my opinion it is incorrect to describe Polish information regarding German atrocities as “trustworthy.” The Poles, and to a far greater extent the Jews, tend to exaggerate German atrocities in order to stoke us up. They seem to have succeeded.
Mr. Allen and myself have both followed German atrocities quite closely. I do not believe that there is any evidence which would be accepted in a Law Court that Polish children have been killed on the spot by Germans when their parents were being deported to work in Germany, nor that Polish children have been sold to German settlers. As regarding putting Poles to death in gas chambers, I do not believe that there is any evidence that this has been done. There have been many stories to this effect, and we have played them up in P.W.E. rumours without believing that they had any foundation. At any rate there is far less evidence than exists for the mass murder of Polish officers by the Russians at Katyn. On the other hand we do know that the Germans are out to destroy Jews of any age unless they are fit for manual labour.
I think that we weaken our case against the Germans by publicly giving credence to atrocity stories for which we have no evidence. These mass executions in gas chambers remind me of the stories of employment of human corpses during the last war for the manufacture of fat, which was a grotesque lie and led to the true stories of German enormities enormities being brushed aside as being mere propaganda.
Minute of 27 August 1943, cited from Robert Jan van Pelt, The Case for Auschwitz: Evidence from the Irving Trial (p. 127).
The bolded line is more or less identical to the FO file note on the Riegner telegram a year earlier, doubting the telegram's reference of 'extermination with one blow' - "The German policy seems to be rather to eliminate "useless mouths" but to use able bodied Jews as slave labourers" (cited from TNA FO 371/30917, p.93 in my 'Conflicting Signals' article, p.384)
References to gassing had been cut from Allied statements around the UN Declaration of 17 December 1942 in favour of just referring to extermination of unfit Jews and using able bodied Jews as forced labourers. The British and Americans, especially the Foreign Office and State Department, were both quite cautious for the reasons noted by Cavendish-Bentick - stories of industrial mass murder did recall the corpse factory hoax of WWI for the generation which remembered the war.
The British had additional reasons in 1943 to be cautious with reporting of the persecution and murder of Jews. Firstly, they did not want the clamour to 'do something' to rescue Jews to result in opening up Palestine to Jewish refugee immigration en masse. Secondly, as a result of this, they were taking an increasingly negative view of Zionist campaigning in the US to mobilise support for a Jewish state, independently of the rescue issue for Europe.
So the result was that ongoing stories about the persecution and murder of the Jews were shoved back to the inside pages, in shorter articles, by throttling the flow of reports which could be published in the mainstream British press. Specialist newspapers could continue but had little space to dedicate to the issue, while Polish exile newspapers had to juggle the victimisation of Poles by the Germans and Ukrainians, and ran into censorship if they tried making too much of Soviet victimisation.
The mainstream US press wasn't a lot better in 1943 to early 1944. Going by German Foreign Office digests of reports of the extermination of the Jews, the press which could run the most coverage, and most detailed coverage, was the Yiddish press in New York (this is noted in Das Amt und die Vergangenheit, and easily confirmed since the files in question are digitised.) Which suited everyone fine as only Jews would read it, whereas the mainstream press was more dependent on governments-in-exile. The New York Times famously did not subscribe to the Jewish Telegraphic Agency wire service bulletin until 1944 (as noted in Laurel Leff, Buried By The Times).
Both the British Foreign Office and US State Department were also dragging their feet and throwing up arguments about the mechanics of potential war crimes prosecutions after the war (see Arieh Kochavi, Prelude to Nuremberg). They had come under pressure from the governments-in-exile in 1942, and had as usual created a commission (the United Nations War Crimes Commission) to kick the issue into the long grass for a while. It took until 1944-45 and political pressure especially after the Malmedy massacre to overcome opposition and start serious planning. The State Department also hated the pressure it came under to make immigration possible - national quotas were underfulfilled in wartime America - which eventually triggered the scandal leading to the formation of the War Refugee Board in 1944. The British of course hated the whole idea of the WRB after kicking the refugee issue into touch at the Bermuda conference of April 1943. They were even more reluctant by 1944-45 due to the worsening unrest in Mandate Palestine.
So the result was a steady stream of shorter stories, as Leff summarises for 1943 (p.164)
Throughout 1943, the New York Times continued to run stories about the extermination of the Jews inside the paper. Stories about the end of individual ghettos appeared on pages 10 and 5. Stories about the end of entire Jewish communities appeared on pages 2 and 6. Stories that tallied the mounting death toll appeared on pages 9 and 7. Stories
that told of the extension of the murderous campaign to Italy and Bulgaria appeared on pages 8, 35, 4, and 6. A story on the precise methods used at the Treblinka extermination camp appeared on page 11. Stories that contained eyewitness testimony from the just-liberated areas of the Soviet Union appeared on pages 3, 10, and 19. Even the stirring accounts
of the Warsaw ghetto uprising and the rescue of Danish Jews were told almost exclusively inside the newspaper. The breakthrough that World Jewish Congress leaders assumed had occurred when the United Nations confirmed Germany’s extermination campaign had not happened. The plight of the Jews still was not considered important enough for the front page.
and to sum up the coverage (Leff, p.4)
Most tellingly, the Times continued to put stories about the Holocaust inside the paper even after doubts about their authenticity evaporated. Most scholars agree that the truth of the Holocaust was established when the 11 Allied governments confirmed the Final Solution in December 1942. But there is no discernible change in the Times coverage after that. Considering all the wartime stories about Jews, the paper printed six such front-page stories in 1940, seven in 1941, nine in 1942, and seven again in 1943. Only in 1944 did the number climb to 12 front-page stories. Nor did the total number of stories printed jump once the extermination campaign was verified. The Times printed 240 stories about what was happening to the Jews in 1940, 207 in 1941, 139 in 1942, 186 in 1943, and 197 in 1944.
The stories being divided up among 24 affected countries, with some getting almost no coverage but even the best covered getting little, with stories typically revolving around persecution/discrimination followed by deportations. There was undoubtedly more coverage of the round-ups and deportations from France in the second half of 1942 than there was coverage of the Holocaust in Poland, because courier channels from Poland had been disrupted in the early summer of 1942.
A good percentage were 'OSINT' reports recapitulating German and Axis official decrees and declarations in the German and Axis press. This is also true for the Jewish Telegraphic Agency daily bulletins, which also drew heavily on the neutral press or which added in the slighest mention anywhere (on the BBC for example) that might not have warranted a standalone newspaper story. Wartime newspapers being smaller in page count, some of the lack of coverage was down to the general squeeze on space. The Jewish press certainly ran more stories, but the typical Jewish newspaper was a weekly and thus could not run everything anyway.
The other stories were identified for their provenance - this or that government-in-exile, mainly. But comparisons between the mainstream press and JTA bulletins would suggest the mainstream press did not run every communique or announcement of a government-in-exile.
Indeed, there were a number of wartime brochures and books by governments-in-exile which were never reviewed in the British press. One on the Germanisation of Poland likely got sidelined because of the post-Katyn kerfuffle or tensions between the British government and PGE.
